Introduction
Tracing lines of continuity and discontinuity is the stock-in-trade of the professional historian (Sewell, 2005) . The writing of management and organizational history is no exception to this rule. The present paper focuses primarily on the continuity side of the coin. It explains how a distinctive bureaucratic pattern -characterized by organizational stakeholders routinely acting in concert to ignore safety rule violations -can constitute the key context for fatal colliery explosions. Examples from the British coal industry in the early twentieth century are juxtaposed to the case of the 2010 mining disaster at Pike River, a remote location on the West Coast of New Zealand's South Isle, where twenty-nine miners perished. Admittedly, every underground coal mine -situated in a fixed spatial and geomorphological locale and within a specific regional and social setting -has unique features. Between the selected past and present disasters there is also substantial technical progress due to the development of mechanized methods of coal mining, which Trist and Bamforth (1951) documented in their famed study into the introduction of underground longwall mining. Yet a singular thread runs like a leitmotif through the British and Antipodean cases. The twin objectives of safety on the one hand, and profits and earnings on the other hand, were juggled by key stakeholders; a process in which safety was let slide in the hope that a disaster would not happen. In explaining such outcomes, we use aspects of organizational theory to label this pattern and to explain how it crystallizes.
J o u r n a l o f M a n a g e m e n t H i s t o r y 3 We take our conceptual cue from work by Hynes and Prasad (1997) who trace the origins of the 1992 explosion at the Westray coal mine, in the Canadian maritime province of Nova Scotia, which resulted in twenty-six miners being killed. The latter authors apply the sociologist Alvin Gouldner's concept of mock bureaucracy, showing that managers and workers were complicit in ignoring an elaborate set of safety rules in a desperate effort to boost revenue and make the mine commercially viable. Mine inspectors knew what was happening, but declined to intervene because Westray was of great political importance to the province. Certainly, Westray and Pike River exhibit commonalities. Though the mines were in essentially the same predicament, struggling to meet financial targets at an early stage of development, this paper's purpose is not to compare the two cases directly. Rather, by bracketing together the Pike River and British mine explosions, we put Hynes and
Prasad's findings in historical perspective.
By showing that the phenomenon defined by Gouldner as mock bureaucracy existed in the early twentieth century British milieu, we also inflect the concept with historical nuance. Central to the concept of mock bureaucracy are understandings not of how rules are made in organizations but rather how they are broken. We argue that despite -and in certain respects because of -the development in 1970s Britain of a new approach to safety management (the Robens system), and its subsequent export to New Zealand, a contemporary coal mine under financial duress, such as Pike River, is a prime site for mock bureaucracy to flourish. Our primary theme, though, is mock bureaucracy, and the regulatory regime is discussed not for its own sake but rather for its implications for the growth of mock bureaucracy. This significantly extends our previous work on British mining disasters (reference withheld). The analysis is distinguished from these earlier writings by the adoption of the mock bureaucracy framework, the introduction of additional case studies and, through the discussion of Pike River, the inclusion of an international comparison.
J o u r n a l o f M a n a g e m e n t H i s t o r y 4 Our paper is organized in the following manner. The first section locates the mock bureaucracy concept within classic industrial sociology and explains how the concept still has relevance. The second section provides a methodological reflection on the official inquiries that are this paper's main source. In the third section, the historical origins of safety rules pertaining to British coal mines are discussed, and comparisons are made to the equivalent New Zealand regulatory regime. The fourth section presents vignettes of three British coal mine explosions -Genwen (1907 ), Wellington Pit (1910 and Gresford (1934) .
The mock bureaucratic context of these disaster events is underscored. As a contemporary example of the distinctive type of mock bureaucracy evident at Gresford, Pike River is examined in the fifth section. Reflecting back on the cases, the concluding section explains why underground coalmining today is vulnerable to mock bureaucracy arising within the sphere of safety. The discussion finishes with some future research directions.
Resituating the Concept of Mock Bureaucracy
How organizational theory and history intersect is a topic of interest both to organizational scholars and to management and business historians (Clark and Rowlinson, 2004) . Within the domain of the theory of bureaucracy specifically, sensitivity to the risks of abstracting concepts from history has been present in work by the field's sociological founders since the outset (Albrow, 1970) . It was none other than the pioneer of bureaucratic theory, Max
Weber, who advanced the methodological notion of the 'ideal type' -which by its very nature is open to context and history (Weber, 1922 (Weber, /1964 .
The dangers of a 'grand theory' disconnected from history have been highlighted by US-based Weberians such as C.W. Mills (1959 Mills ( /1983 . Set against this backcloth, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy by Alvin Gouldner -an American sociologist of Weberian stripes -is a seemingly aberrant case (Gouldner, 1964) . Built around a snapshot of a single gypsum mine and processing plant, circa the early 1950s, the study is dated to a particular time and terms of one organizational taxonomy, they incline as much to the craft as to the bureaucratic end of the continuum (Stinchcombe, 1959) . No matter, for it is in analysing the application of rules in particular, rather than the features of bureaucracy in general, that
Gouldner excels (Martin et al., 2013) . Mock bureaucracy occurs when an organization's stakeholders collude to break, bend, or ignore rules in a manner that persists over time and becomes routinized. To be sure, Gouldner's case study does not portray safety regulations as a domain for the operation of mock bureaucracy; the study focuses instead on a tolerant managerial regime under which miners were allowed to ignore a smoking ban. Unlike in a gaseous or dusty coal mine, smoking is not a genuine safety issue in a gypsum mine. Yet, as the sociologist clearly acknowledges, there is no reason why, at other sites, safety rules cannot be the object of mock bureaucracy (Gouldner, 1964, p. 205) . Simply put, the rule violation pattern Gouldner documented is not unique to any particular type of rule.
Gouldnerian insights into routinized rule-breaking are eminently applicable to safety rules in underground coal mining. At Westray, Hynes and Prasad (1997, p. 611 DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) . In this vein, Martin et al. (2013) argue that consensual rule violation can occur at the level of the interplay between organization and institutional field.
In a manner Gouldner did not envisage, there is a real 'possibility of organizational-level rule-breaking permitted by field-level actors' (Martin et al., 2013, p. 558, emphasis in original) . Such actors include, but are not limited to, industry regulators, safety enforcement agencies, and anti-competition watchdogs. If the mock bureaucracy concept can be modified in this way, what would institutional-level mock bureaucracy in underground coal-mining, specifically in relation to safety, look like? Though the paper by Hynes and Prasad (1997) both predates the comprehensive review by Martin et al. (2013) and does not feature in the review, the write-up of the fieldwork on which Hynes and Prasad draw provides an answer.
The characteristics of the institutional-level rule-breaking pattern are as follows:
management and the mining inspectorate may collude in such a way that management is lax in its statutory responsibilities to enforce certain rules and the monitoring body, the mine inspectors, implicitly or explicitly, allow the non-compliance to continue (Hynes, 1999, p. 117 ).
As we shall see, evidence can be adduced from the British cases to demonstrate both the workplace-based and institutional-level forms of mock bureaucracy. In the case of Pike River, for reasons we will explain in the fifth section, the evidence points to the institutional level as the locus of mock bureaucracy.
Methodological Reflection on Sources
Most of the evidence for our investigation is taken from published official accident inquiries.
In the case of Pike River, the New Zealand government established a Royal Commission which held hearings and published a two volume report on the tragedy. Official inquiriesoften very detailed ones -were also conducted into mining disasters in Britain in the early twentieth century. 2 Clearly, one of the advantages of using such documents is the wealth of fine-grained detail that they contain, which cannot be found elsewhere. (Hutter, 1992) . They do not seek explicitly to find a culprit, although in most cases they cannot avoid making some criticism of management or employees, or of both.
We acknowledge that disaster reports should be read critically. There is a ceremonial element to official inquiries and reports (Hilgartner, 2007) . Moreover, interpretations could well be twisted to support the status quo. Brown (2000) , for example, argues that the Allitt Report into the background to the murder of four children by Beverly Allitt, a nurse at a Lincolnshire hospital in 1991, was constructed in such a way as to exonerate the medical profession from any suggestion of culpability or negligence. More generally, it has been argued that official disaster inquiries are designed first and foremost to deflect criticism of the authorities and powerful business interests (Birkland, 2009 
Development of Safety Systems in British and New Zealand Coal Mines
Since this paper compares British mining disasters in the early twentieth century with the disaster at Pike River in 2010, it is important to distinguish between the regulatory regimes in operation in each period. British coal mine regulation originated in the middle of the nineteenth century, as Parliament responded firstly to scandals about women and children working underground, and then to a stream of explosions and other disasters. The drivers of regulation were humanitarianism and pressure from the miners. Regulation became increasingly detailed over time, and the number of government inspectors grew (Bryan, 1975) . Advances in scientific knowledge, and the diffusion of new technologies such as electrically-powered machinery and communications systems, prompted a series of regulatory responses during the early twentieth century (Rockley, 1938) . the main threat to health and safety was apathy, and his solution was to engage the interest of employers and the workforce in the assessment and management of risk in the workplace (Sirrs, 2015; Robens, 1972) .
In due time, the Robens model was transposed to New Zealand, albeit not immediately and not without modification. The first major reform to New Zealand legislation, the Coal Mines Act 1979, maintained a rules-based approach to safety issues. It was not until the Health and Safety Act 1992 that New Zealand migrated to a generic risk management approach, though the Mining Inspectorate retained a degree of autonomy until 1998. It should also be noted that the 1992 Act was introduced at a time of radical labour market deregulation in New Zealand (Anderson and Quinlan, 2008) , and inevitably owed something to that context as well as to the Robens doctrine. Achieved in 1991, this deregulation dispensed with all remnants of New Zealand's distinctive arbitration system, in which union representational rights were enshrined, and replaced it with a system of employment contracts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the comparatively poor health and safety outcomes that ensued in New Zealand were due, in part, to the strengthening of employer prerogative in the health and safety field, and the minimal penalties prescribed for River. On the other hand, the New Zealand approach was more flexible. If employers and workers were genuinely committed to identifying and combatting risk, such flexibility was advantageous. The essential point is not that one approach was better than the other, but that they were different in important respects, and these differences have implications for the locus of mock bureaucracy. As we will show, compliance was haphazard under both the old British and the modern New Zealand arrangements. As risk and safety-consciousness pervades contemporary work organizations and society at large, the fact that this unevenness persists demands explanation. (Church et al., 1986, pp. 304-305; Supple, 1987, pp. 8-9) . Roughly 80 per cent of employees worked underground. Hence we can calculate that an underground coal miner had about a 1 in 8400 chance each year of dying in an explosion.
Since a typical miner, if fully employed, worked 250 days per year (Anney, 2013, p. 40) , his chance of dying in an explosion on a given shift was about 1 in 2,000,000.
Genwen
We begin our analysis of mock bureaucracy in early twentieth century British coal mines with the official inquiry into the firedamp (methane gas) and coal dust explosion at Genwen Colliery, South Wales, which occurred on 5 March 1907. Six miners died including two engaged in rescue operations. A more or less forgotten accident at a small mine, Genwen merits attention for two reasons. Firstly, the official report by Atkinson and Lewis, both mines inspectors, was particularly explicit about the failings of management (Atkinson and Lewis, 1907) . Secondly, the report suggests that management and workers colluded in lazy and dangerous practices underground, especially in relation to lamps and the reporting of gas. This is the stuff of mock bureaucracy. Redmayne succeeded in showing is that mock bureaucracy -whereby miners and underground managers knowingly and together ignored safety rules -was the organizational backdrop against which the Wellington Pit explosion occurred. (Redmayne and Pope, 1911, p. 7) . Poor ventilation allowed firedamp to linger and accumulate. Record keeping in relation to air quality was sloppy. Under regulations, the miners ought to have been withdrawn from the affected area whenever the amount of gas reached 2 ½ per cent of the air, and the withdrawal noted in a special book. But miners and officials, including deputies and overmen -the most junior levels of the management hierarchy -were reluctant to report gas, often preferring to clear or waft it away if present in apparently small amounts. Miners at the coal face (hewers) were paid a piece rate and did not want to lose wages for gas stoppages. Some were inclined, in their own words, to 'fettle on' and accept the risk even when there was a potentially dangerous amount of gas, and in the knowledge that they were flouting the regulations (Redmayne and Pope, 1911, p. 10) .
For mock bureaucracy to exist it is not necessary that incumbents within all levels of the managerial hierarchy be aware and tolerant of rule-breaking; only some need be. In this case, deputies and overmen colluded with the miners to ignore gas events. The lack of control underground was this pattern's breeding ground. While Robert Steele, the mine manager -and therefore the person legally responsible for safety at the pit -expressed disapproval of his subordinates' inadequate gas reporting, the fact that it was recurring demonstrated that he was not fully in control (Redmayne and Pope, 1911, p. 34) .
Wellington Pit, concluded the report, presented a sorry example of 'laxity in the matter of Dominy had visited the mine without actually descending the pit. When Dominy had gone underground he had not seen much of the pit. Yet Dominy had known about the haphazard record keeping at Gresford, especially in relation to measurements of air and gas, and had done nothing about it. Despite being cognisant of regulatory breaches, he had been too ready to accept the word of management that everything was nonetheless under control. As Dominy admitted during cross-examination, he had regarded an explosion at Gresford as impossible (Williamson, 1999, pp. 145-149) .
In his dissenting report on the inquiry, Joseph Jones, the assessor representing the interests of the workmen, described the performance of the Inspectorate as 'insufficient and ineffective'. He also suggested that the disaster could have been avoided if management had been pressed more firmly to abide by regulations (Walker, Brass, and Jones, 1937, p. 146 ).
The mining inspectorate thus permitted safety rule non-compliance to persist over time.
Inspectors were aware of breaches in record keeping, and relied on the reassurances of managers who themselves knew that records were lacking. As such, Gresford exemplifies institutional-level mock bureaucracy.
The Pike River Disaster
In relation to collusive rule-breaking, Pike River bears similarity to the mining disasters Miners were offered a large bonus for getting coal into production; the amount of the bonus diminished with every week's delay. The recording of gas levels was patchy and reports of high concentrations were sometimes overlooked by management. Some gas sensors were defective, while others were disabled by workmen anxious to get on with the job instead of stopping for alarms (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012, Vol. 2, p. 136, pp. 141-143) . According to the Royal Commission, 'the hydro bonus at Pike created particular risks' and it was troubling that management did not give careful consideration to the implications of the bonus for health and safety (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012, Vol. 2, p. 162).
Methods used for draining methane from the coal face were also inadequate. In September 2010, some of the second intake of trainees had complained that 'the safety approach taught in the classroom was not always evident underground' (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012, Vol. 2, p. 65). Construction of a viable second form of egress from the mine was also accorded a lower priority than ensuring that coal production commenced as soon as possible. As an interim expedient, a ladder was installed in a vertical ventilation shaft. Healthy miners would have struggled to climb to the surface in normal circumstances, let alone in an emergency (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012, Vol. 2, p. 226). Amazingly, at the time of the explosion, management had no failsafe means of knowing who was actually underground.
The above examples do not exhaust the mine's design and operational defects. There are too many to enumerate here, but the point is this: the plethora of deficiencies is due in no small measure to the 1970s shift in emphasis within mine safety systems from detailed regulation and rule compliance, in combination with strong external enforcement, to
Robens-style self-managed risk assessments. This is a system premised upon an organization's senior participants accepting accountability for ensuring the safety and wellbeing of all in the workplace. At Pike River, this responsibility simply was not met. The interests while favouring other departments, especially those regarded as being more central to achieving paramount organizational goals, is a classic strategic contingencies phenomenon (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977) . Senior managers and directors were complacent about safety, but deeply concerned about delays in production and the mine's desperate financial situation. As a result, risk assessments were perfunctory, where they occurred at all. Deemed by the Royal Commission to be woefully inadequate, the ventilation plan is a prime example. The plan stipulated there must be a ventilation engineer, but one was not appointed. In short, 'the company largely ignored this plan and it was not an effective risk control' (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012, Vol. 2, p. 164).
Though Pike River possessed a health and safety management system on paper,
clearly it had glaring faults. Further, the Royal Commission concluded that there was a serious 'gap between the documented system and actual practices underground' (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012, Vol. 2, p. 77). Good practice was set aside in the interests of production, in the belief (which was borne out until 19
November) that, in New Zealand parlance, 'she'll be right.'
Flexible though the Robens approach may be, financial and production pressures converted this flexibility into rubbery safety and risk management practices at Pike River. of the Robens-like safety systems per se, but rather in the fertile soil they provide for institutional-level mock bureaucracy to take root. For that to happen there must be acts of omission or commission by the mining inspectorate. As the next part of our paper explains, slack enforcement and inspection compounded risk management failures at the company.
The final piece of the mock bureaucratic pattern, therefore, was put into place by the inspectorate itself. [t]his failure not only allowed a highly questionable ventilation system at Pike River, but also set the tone for subsequent interactions between the company and the inspectorate (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012, Vol. 2, p. 197 ).
Mock bureaucracy at Pike River
To the extent that inspectors did not challenge arrangements that fell below industry best practice, and in some cases accepted regulatory non-compliance, the tonality was that of mock bureaucracy. , 2012, Vol. 2, p. 199) .
Given that inspectors almost literally never specified in the agreements a deadline or The second incident centres on the lack of a second practicable means of egress.
After conducting an underground inspection on 8 April 2010, Inspector Poynter concluded that the vertical shaft with the ladder 'was not a suitable emergency escapeway' and requested of the company 'a plan and timeline' for a 'walkout egress' (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012, Vol. 2, p. 199 
Conclusion
This paper has shown that, despite its origins in an old-fashioned Gouldnerian field study, the concept of mock bureaucracy is not a sociological curiosity. Building on extant academic literature, we redefined the concept to mean a pattern of collusive rule-breaking with two sub-types (workplace and institutional). These are not tied to any particular type of rule or, for that matter, any wider bureaucratic form that might render the concept susceptible to the criticism that we live in a post-bureaucratic age. By juxtaposing the British explosions with the Pike River incident, we have been able to demonstrate that the concept has analytical purchase in relation to contemporary mining disasters, beyond the single case of
Westray that is the focus of Hynes and Prasad's (1997) Two developments result in the mock bureaucratic pattern recurring. The first is the much higher capital intensity of modern coal mining. Mine operators experiencing problems extracting sufficient quantities of coal to defray costs are subject to greater business risk than in the days of 'pick and shovel' labour-intensive mining. Our discussion of Pike River displays this pressure. Yet it also reveals how light-handed regulation, stressing
Robens-style responsibilized self-assessment, provides wriggle room for managers of mining companies under financial duress to downplay the safety management side of this risk. Not only was inspectional cursoriness and inaction still a problem under the very different regulatory environment that obtained in early twenty-first century New Zealand, the regime invited it. Indeed, the Robens system made it easier for mine managers and mine inspectors to fudge the development and review of safety arrangements and procedures.
That fudging, we maintain, exhibits all of the characteristics of institutional-level mock bureaucracy.
The directions for further research that emerge from our findings are threefold. industries where the cost of establishing a new site means that safety all too readily takes a back seat to profitability. In relation to coal mining, in particular, careful examination should be given to the case for and against industry-specific safety regulation and monitoring of companies by dedicated government agencies with a clear enforcement mandate. The role of strong safety legislation in promoting corporate social responsibility has recently featured in academic discourse (Hart, 2010) . This is a promising avenue of inquiry to pursue in subsequent studies of how to improve the behaviour of mining company participants within the safety domain.
Thirdly, and finally, we believe it is important to move beyond the mining industry and apply the concept of mock bureaucracy more widely. Historically, underground mining in Britain was an activity replete with masculinist values (McDowell and Massey, 1984) . In countries such as the US and India, this gendering process persists (Scott, 2010; LahiriDutt, 2007) . Mills (2010) has shown, primarily for Cornish tin mining, but also for coal mining, how masculine attitudes affected risk taking before the First World War, and it would be worthwhile exploring this area further. The cultural mediation of sentiments and behaviours that contribute to mock bureaucracy warrants greater attention. Mining's occupational masculinism provides a reason to transpose the concept of mock bureaucracy to risk-laden work settings with a different cultural inflection, including industries like textiles and clothing that have high fire risk and a high proportion of women workers.
Though originating in a case study of gypsum mining, from which the extension to coal mining naturally follows, the concept could be employed by management and business historians investigating a wide range of other industries. These include banking and 3 By 1900 most coal mines used a massive extractor fan to suck air through the system of underground roadways and coal faces. 4 Note that the pipes and matches were not believed by Atkinson and Lewis to have caused the explosion (Atkinson and Lewis, 1907, p. 8) .
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